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Abstract—The deployment of business critical applications
and information infrastructures are moving to the cloud. This
means they are hosted in large scale data centers with other
business applications and infrastructures with less (or none)
mission critical constraints. This mixed and complex environment
makes very challenging the process of monitoring critical appli-
cations and handling (detecting and recovering) possible failures
of servers’ data center that could affect responsiveness and/or
reliability of mission critical applications. Monitoring mechanisms
used in data center are usually intrusive in the sense that they
need to install agents on each single server. This has considerable
drawbacks: huge usage of human resources to install and patch
the system and interference with the critical application because
agents share application resources.
In order to detect (and possibly predict) failures in data
centers the paper does a first attempt in showing the correlation
between network traffic and servers’ power consumption. This is
an important step in deriving non-intrusive monitoring systems,
as both network traffic and power consumption can be captured
without installing any software at the servers. This will improve
in its turn the overall resiliency of the data center and its self-
managing capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider as examples very diverse applications such as a
large scale payroll for the entire public administration of a
country, consumer credit support or a system running a secu-
rities market. These are mission critical applications for the
stability of the country. Thus they need to run with very strict
non-functional requirements in terms of reliability, security and
responsiveness to application end-users. For economic reasons,
it is expected that such applications will migrate on a “public
administration” private cloud shortly, where they will coexist
with other applications that have less stringent (or none) non-
functional requirements. Such cloud will reside on as few large
data centers as possible in order to get the maximum saving
and, at the same time, to concentrate the IT control. Each
of these data centers will include thousands of servers, large
scale storage and communication infrastructure. Thus a key
role for satisfying requirements of a mission critical application
is carried out by a monitoring system that is able to report
and to timely react to failures happening in the data center.
Such failures could indeed either deteriorate the performance
or block a mission critical application.
Thus this paper concentrates on the design of a monitoring
system based on the information coming from network traffic
exchanged among servers and servers power consumption.
The aim of this paper is to show the existence of correlation
between network traffic and power consumption that can be
used to asses (and to possibly predict) failures in the data
centers. To highlight this correlation we did an extensive
experimentation in one of the four data centers of the Italian
Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF).
MEF is the executive body responsible for economic,
financial and budget policy, planning of public investment, co-
ordinating public expenditure and verifying its trends, revenue
policies and tax system in Italy. The entire MEF infrastructure
is designed to have a high resiliency degree, to prevent the
complete interruption of a service in case of failure. The MEF
IT ecosystem is always under the control of an advanced and
complex monitoring system, which continuously checks the
health state of hardware and software, of the network and
of the end-user experience. Nonetheless, monitoring systems
employed at MEF have two main point of weakness: (i) the
approach is reactive: able only to react to failure events when
they have already occurred and (ii) monitoring systems require
the installation on each server of software probes, determining
a huge impact in terms o management effort and procedures.
Thus, in the design of a new monitoring system, we
highlighted the following two properties: (i) no deployment of
software probes (non-intrusive monitoring), and (ii) agnostic
with respect to applications running in the data center, (black-
box monitoring). Non-intrusive monitoring can be realized
observing network traffic and power consumption, without
deploying any software probes, but relying on sniffing net-
work packets (without introducing packets or delay in the
network) and reading power consumption through smart Power
Distribution Unit (smart-PDU) in order to accurately measure
the power consumption at each rack enclosure. After several
months of experiments we were able to demonstrate that there
is correlation between network traffic and power consumption
and this correlation can be used to design failure prediction
techniques, to improve data centers resiliency. This phase of
experimentation is reported in the paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the related work; Section III describes the major issues
in data center monitoring and introduces an architecture for
this; Section IV describes the first experimental campaign and
describe the MEF data center that we used as testbed; Section
V concludes the paper.
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II. RELATED WORK
Monitoring based only on network traffic is recognized
to be non-intrusive and black-box, meaning that (i) no
application-level knowledge is needed to perform the moni-
toring [1], [2], [3], and (ii) the monitor mechanism does not
install software on the monitored system [3]. In [3] CASPER is
presented, a non-intrusive and black-box approach to monitor
air traffic control systems. It uses network traffic only in order
to represent the system health so as to recognize deviations
thus triggering failure prediction. At the best of our knowledge,
this is the only work that is both non-intrusive and black-
box. In the context of symptoms monitoring mechanisms,
there exist research works that use black-box approaches, i.e.,
no knowledge of the applications of the system is required.
Narasimhan et. all [1] introduce Tiresias, a black-box failure
prediction system that considers symptoms generated by faults
in distributed systems. Tiresias uses a set of performance met-
rics that are system-level metrics, (e.g., UNIX proc file system
metrics) and network traffic metrics. Tan et al. [4] presents
ALERT an anomaly prediction system that considers the hosts
of the monitored system as black-boxes. Specifically, it uses
sensors deployed in all the hosts of the controlled infrastructure
to continuously monitor a set of metrics concerning CPU
consumption, memory usage, input/output data rate. In this
sense, ALERT can be categorized as an intrusive monitoring
system that makes use of triple-state decision trees in order
to classify component states of the monitored system. The
authors in [2] consider the problem of discovering performance
bottlenecks in large scale distributed systems consisting of
black-box software components (usually without source code
available and not accessible due to vendors restrictions). The
system introduced in [2] solves the problem by using message-
level traces related to the activity of the monitored system in
a non-intrusive fashion (passively and without any knowledge
of node internals or semantics of messages).
Most of the studies on power consumption monitoring in
data centers have been conducted in the context of power
management and energy efficiency [5], [6], [7]. None of these
works, however, concerns data centers resiliency. In [8] and
[9] network traffic is monitored with the aim of consolidating
traffic flows onto a small set of links and switches so as to
shut down unused network elements, thereby reducing power
consumption. However, there is no attempt to correlate network
traffic and power consumption. Methods for detection of cyber
attacks that exploit monitored power consumption data have
been investigated in the context of power network systems
[10], [11], [12]. In [12] local information about power con-
sumption, generation, and power flow are used for distributed
detection of cyber attacks in power networks. In [13] a study
on correlation between power consumption data and utilization
statistics (CPU load and network traffic) is presented. This
work shows a strong correlation between power consumption
and CPU load of desktop computers. In the context of server
racks, the authors conclude that CPU utilization alone does
not completely explain the variation of power consumption,
suggesting that additional metrics should be taken into account.
Our work is considerably different for two reasons. First of
all our study addresses resiliency, while [13] concerns energy
efficiency. Moreover, our work is based on a non-intrusive and
black-box approach, while the monitoring infrastructure used
in [13] is not black-box, nor non-intrusive. Indeed, it requires
software installation on monitored machines to track CPU
utilization and to collects network-traffic statistics through
SNMP, thus introducing additional traffic in the network.
To the best of our knowledge no previous work has
investigated the possibility to exploit the correlation between
power consumption and network traffic to improve data centers
resiliency.
III. ARCHITECTURE
A. Critical Infrastructure data centers
The data centers that manage IT services of critical in-
frastructures, such as ministries, financial institutions, trans-
portations, power grid, and so on, are nowadays at a huge
level of complexity. The requirements of fault tolerance and
of resilience in case of failure are very stringent, thus implying
an high level of replication, both hardware and software, active
and passive. Hundreds of physical blade servers (rack-mount),
each one hosting tens of virtual machines, are organized in rack
enclosures (19-inch rack). Each enclosure can physically hosts
up to about 45 rack units. A rack unit can be a blade server,
a network device, such as a switch, or other kinds of devices,
including cooling mechanisms. Data centers commonly used
by public organizations, can be composed by hundreds of
such enclosures, occupying big rooms, entire floors or multiple
floors. The power supply is ensured by at least two indepen-
dent supply loops connected to the enclosure, with overload
protection systems. Power consumption is usually monitored
using a centralized monitoring system. From a network point
of view, several switches connect servers within the single
enclosure and among enclosures, according to policies of
network segmentation, applied both for privacy and security
reasons.
All of the components in this environment are off-the-shelf
and multiple vendors provide hardware in a single institution’s
data center. Heterogeneous and continuously changing hard-
ware can also be found among the blade servers in a single
enclosure, among the power supplies of multiple enclosures,
among network devices of the same network and so on. All of
this complexity and heterogeneity led to a situation in which
the commonly used (and easiest) ways to take measurement
about power consumption, or about network load, can have a
significant deviation from the reality. This means that if one
wants to monitor the actual network load of an enclosure, and
the actual power consumption of it, the only way to do is by
monitor the power distribution unit and the network switches
of the enclosure.
In the following, we describe how a dataset composed by
actual network traces and actual power consumption traces of
a single enclosure of a real critical infrastructure data center
can be created.
B. Analyzing network traffic
Several works have been presented in literature which aim
is to monitor systems performance using also network data
(i.e., packet rate, packet size, bandwidth etc) [1], [2]. Some
works use only network data to monitor system health [3].
These works have demonstrated that network can carry a large
amount of data for monitoring purposes. Without examine
the payload of packets, thus respecting privacy, sometimes
network only can represent the level of health of a system.
An added value is given by the possibility of monitoring an
existing system in a real non-intrusive way: no software needs
to be installed in servers, only a very small number of probes
deployed properly can collect the information required. This
has an extreme value for system administrators: a new way
for monitoring and enhancing resiliency that requires only a
small investment in time and money for the deployment. Note
that, given the complexity described above of the modern data
centers (III-A), installing a new monitor software requires a
huge amount of human time or, if outsourced, a significant
amount of economic resources. According to the network
topology of the data center, network sniffers can be installed
in order to monitor different granularity levels of network
traffic. For example, if we imagine to monitor each single
enclosure, network sniffers can be installed at the level of
the switches of the enclosure to be monitored. This would
provide performance indicators of all the hosts (typically
virtual machines) running on that enclosure, e.g., for each host:
• inner/outer packet rate;
• inner/outer bandwidth;
• inner/outer message size.
Of course, same indicators can be computed for the whole
enclosure, giving an overview of the traffic managed by the
enclosure itself and of the load that it experiences in real
time. The indicators produced can be used in real time in
several ways, e.g., reported to a dashboard, used to classify the
behavior of the system, used to instrument an inferential engine
in order to recognize deviation from the correct behavior.
These indicators gain an extreme value when correlated with
other functional data for instance, power consumption.
C. Analyzing energy consumption
Usually data centers are equipped with energy monitors
with the aim to (i) control the quality (picks analysis, harmonic
distortion, etc) of the energy provided by the utility company
and (ii) take care of the load balancing among the three phases
of the three-phase energy provisioning.
In the recent years power consumption monitoring is get-
ting finer granularity, sometimes providing energy consumed
also by every single machine. Knowing this information is
very useful: it allows user administrators to know which
machines are really working. Power consumption contains a
huge amount of information regarding CPU and storage usage,
allowing the administrator to correctly balance the load among
the machines. Unfortunately, blade servers systems aggregate
the consumption of all contained machines, thus hiding the
power consumption of the single server. This problem can be
solved by making use of very precise energy meters: a CPU
performing a complex job always augment power consumption
of the enclosure for a time that is similar to the task length.
If that time results sufficiently long (e.g., a minute), it can
be clearly identified in the consumption shape. Sometimes,
a task fails into forcing its CPU in a loop state. Power
consumption monitoring can reveal that very quickly, thus
avoiding a domino effect that can affect several machines in
the data center.
Power consumption data, which monitoring can produce
very relevant information to augment resiliency, are:
• voltage;
• current;
• power factor.
Voltage and current can be used to compute power con-
sumption shape, power factor is useful since can reveal in large
advance an hardware failure: for example, if a power supply
is loosing fast its own efficiency (i.e. a power factor running
toward zero) it probably will encounter a failure. Having a
power factor monitoring for each power supply can really help
in this.
D. Preliminary architecture for enhancing resiliency
Considering the advantages of having a non intrusive
system to monitor and enhance resiliency of a critical infras-
tructure data center, we designed a preliminary architecture
that correlates network data and power consumption in real
time, for a single enclosure. The architecture is depicted in
Figure 1. The whole architecture lives inside a centralizer. the
centralizer can be an ordinary computer or a blade server.
It takes in input (i) n streams of network packets, directly
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Fig. 1. Software Architecture of a non-intrusive black block monitoring
system correlating network traffic and power consumption.
produced by n probes (network sniffers that capture packets
from the switches of the enclosure); (ii) a stream of power
consumption data from the smart-PDUs (that measure with
high precision the power consumption of the monitored en-
closure) and (iii) some user-defined data that we will explain
below. The output of the architecture is (i) a Real Time Graph
(RTG) reporting the topology of the network in real time
along with several information about the nodes composing it
with their interactions and (ii) alerts and prediction of failures,
once the monitoring system recognized deviations from the
correct enclosure behavior. A description of all the modules
composing the architecture is now provided.
a) Merger: a software module that takes in input n
streams of captured packets and gives in output a single
network stream opportunely merged1.
b) Network Stream DB: Network traces can be stored
for future analysis, for example in case of failure. Due to the
big amount of data, network traces can be stored only for
some days, according to the centralizer storage capability. The
Network Stream DB maintains the past network traces for a
fixed number of days.
c) Graph Identifier: a software module that takes in
input a stream of network packets and recognizes the topology
of the network producing the stream. Complex statistics can
be computed among the nodes interactions. The graph can be
displayed in real time.
d) Relevant Nodes and Couples Identifier (RNCI): a
software module that takes in input a graph from the Graph
Identifier module and assesses which nodes or couples of nodes
are particularly relevant. This module can also receive from
a user known nodes identifiers (ip addresses) or couple of
nodes which interactions are known to be relevant. The logic,
according to which RNCI assesses nodes and couples, can
use topology characteristics (e.g., fan in, fan out of nodes) or
characteristics of the interaction among nodes (e.g., message
rate between a couple, inner and outer message rate of a node,
protocol used during interaction).
e) Indicators Computer: a software module that takes
in input the network stream and, according to a set of rules,
produces in real time indicators (e.g., message rate, bandwidth,
message size, message rate per network protocol, message rate
per physical machine). The indicators are grouped in tuples and
produced in real time with a given frequency, for instance, one
tuple per second. This led to have a snapshot of the observed
system per second, for example, if we consider message rate,
bandwidth, tcp messages, average message size, we would
have a tuple, like the following, per second:
< sec : 3; 4387msg/s; 14042896bps; 2632tcp msgs; 400byte >
meaning that during the third second of observation there have
been 4387 messages, a mean bandwidth of 14042896 bit per
second, 2632 tcp messages and an average message size of
400 bytes. Instead of producing a tuple representing the whole
monitored system, the same tuple can be produced per single
node or per couple of node, according to what RNCI module
produces in output. In that case the tuple will contain also the
ip address of the node (or the couple of ip addresses) which
the tuple refers to. In the latter case, each second, Indicator
Computer will produce a set of tuples, one representing the
whole system and one per each node or couple provided
by the RNCI module. Indicators Computer module can be
implemented combining Complex Event Processing techniques
[14] and network statistics softwares (e.g., tcpstat [15]).
f) Indicators DB: Tuples of indicators can be stored
for future analysis, for example in case of failure. Tuples are
aggregated data, thus are an amount of data very reduced if
compared with network traces. This means that tuples can be
stored for a long period of time. Indicators DB maintains the
past tuples of indicator for a number of months.
1merging network traces is a solved problem, several tools are available. A
synchronization of the probes is required e.g., a NTP server.
g) Inferential Engine: a software module that using
indicators tuples and power consumption data correlates them
and, according to machine learning algorithms, triggers timely
alerts or failure predictions if recognizes deviations from
correct system behavior. The Inferential Engine is a crucial part
of the architecture, that requires an accurate learning phase in
order to build a knowledge base regarding the observed system.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
One of the pillars of this paper is the assumption that
network data can be correlated with power consumption in
order to enhance the resiliency of complex data centers. The
scope of the first campaign of analysis has been answer to the
following question:
Does it make sense correlating network data and power
consumption in a real critical infrastructure data center?
In order to provide an answer, we conducted a six months long
experimental session along with Sogei s.p.a., a company of
Italian Ministry of Economic and Finance (MEF) that manage
the IT of the ministry. In particular we deployed part of the
architecture presented before (section III), in order to monitor
a single enclosure of one of the data centers of MEF. Details
about the data center follow.
A. Testbed: Italian Ministry of Economic and Finance data
center
The MEF Data Center where we carried out experiments is
a medium-size facility, featuring the following main numbers:
80 physical servers; 250 virtual servers; 20 network devices;
8 security devices; more than 50 different Web Applica-
tions; 2 Storage Area Network with more than 6 TB of
disk space; more than 1000 internal users and more 80.000
external managed single users; The network architecture has
been conceived to conciliate security, scalability and resiliency
issues. It is divided into four main zones with increasing
levels of security; each zone hosts servers and services with
homogeneous requirements in terms of security and privacy:
• The DMZ zone, to host all the systems used to allow
the reachability of MEF applications from the outside
world;
• The Web zone, to host the “user/consumer logic” layer
of the applications;
• The Application zone, to host the “business logic”
layer of the applications;
• The Database zone, to host data and DBMS.
All the network devices (switches, routers, firewalls) are new
generation, that simplifies the network fabric by converging
both storage area network (SAN) and LAN connectivity onto
a single 10 Gigabit Ethernet link.
B. Probes deployment
Figure 2 depicts how we deployed network probes and
Smart-PDUs in order to monitor one enclosure. The monitored
enclosure uses four network switches in order to allow its
servers to communicate among them and toward the rest of
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Power Lines
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Fig. 2. Deployment of network probes and Smart-PDUs at MEF data center.
the data center. Since we want to monitor all the traffic sent
and received by the enclosure and all the traffic among the
servers inside the enclosure, we deployed four network sniffers
(four mini-pc Sapphire EDGE-HD3, with an additional USB
ethernet adapter, running tcpdump [16]), one per network
switch. One of the Probes acts as centralizer, collecting data
from the other three and from two Smart-PDUs manufactured
by Over [17] that measure the power consumption of the entire
enclosure. The power consumption is sampled with a rate of
one measure every 10 seconds. Synchronization is achieved
using an NTP server. An additional network switch is required
in order to grant communication among probes and Smart-
PDUs. All the deployed hardware is passive with respect to
the data center: it does not have an IP-address and no network
packets are introduced. Figure 3 is a picture of one of the
prototypal Smart-PDUs, behind the monitored enclosure.
Fig. 3. Smart-PDUs deployement at MEF data center
C. Dataset
For this first part of the analysis, the probes collected
network traces only. Correlation and study on captured data are
done off-line. In this way, we built a dataset of approximately
2.5 Terabyte, representing the behavior of the monitored en-
closure from a network and power consumption point of view,
during the period 31 July 2013 - 31 January 2014. The dataset
is composed by pcap network traces and a database of power
consumption data2.
D. Correlation
Correlation between network traffic and power consump-
tion would allow to make different hypothesis on the observed
system. For example, if we assume the CPU as the main power
consuming component, we could assess:
2The DB of power consumption is in the format: 〈timestamp, active power,
reactive power, phase displacement〉.
1) a CPU intensive task can augment power consump-
tion thus reducing network traffic (anticorrelation);
2) a network intensive task can reduce power consump-
tion due to reduced CPU load (anticorrelation);
3) a network and CPU idle period reduces network
traffic and power consumption (correlation);
4) a network and CPU intensive task can augment power
consumption (correlation).
In order to verify the correlation among the data composing
the dataset created, and to provide an answer to the question
reported at the begin of this section, we graphed apparent
power consumed by the enclosure, total packet rate (internal,
toward and from the enclosure) and the population correlation
coefficient among them. The population correlation coefficient,
also knows as Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient
ρX,Y , widely used as corr(X,Y ), is a measure of the linear
correlation between two random variables X and Y , and is
defined as follows:
corr(X,Y ) =
cov(X,Y )
σXσY
=
E[(X − µX)(Y − µY )]
σXσY
where E is the expected value, cov is the covariance, µX ,
µY is the expected value of X and Y respectively, σX and
σY are their standard deviations. corr(X,Y ) returns a value
between −1 and 1. If X and Y are two independent variables,
corr(X,Y ) = 0; If |corr(X,Y )| > 0.7 there is a strong cor-
relation, while if 0.3 < |corr(X,Y )| < 0.7 the correlation is
moderate. corr(X,Y ) > 0 in the case of a direct (increasing)
linear relationship (correlation), corr(X,Y ) < 0 in the case
of a decreasing (inverse) linear relationship (anticorrelation).
Figure 4 reports the obtained graphs for a two and a half
hours long period of monitoring. The graph above reports the
mean apparent power consumption of the enclosure, the graph
in the center the mean packets rate, as defined before, and
the graph below the correlation coefficient between packets
per seconds and apparent power, during time. The mean is
computed considering a sliding window of 10 minutes (see
below). The temporal axes are aligned among the three graphs.
During the period reported in Figure 4 apparent power
consumed by the enclosure is between 1622 W and 1636 W
while packet rate is between 1000 pps and 7000 pps.
In order to compute the correlation between power con-
sumption and packet rate, we considered a 10 minutes sliding
window, with a sampling rate of one sample every 10 seconds.
In Figure 4 we identified three periods in which the correlation
has particularly interesting behavior. Period 1 is thirty minutes
long and embodies a behavior in which the apparent power and
packets per seconds increase and decrease in a very similar
manner. This implies a very high level of correlation, near to
1, meaning that power consumption and network traffic are
directly correlated. Period 3 highlights a behavior similar to
Period 1. Period 2 highlights a period of anticorrelation: pack-
ets rate is decreasing while power consumption is increasing.
According to the correlation definition, during the three periods
we can see a strong correlation (corr(X,Y ) > |0.7|). The
absence of periods in which the correlation is 0 tells us that
correlation between power consumption and network traffic
exists. This has been observed in all the dataset produced
during the experimentation.
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Fig. 4. Correlation between mean apparent power and mean packet rate.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This work investigated the feasibility of on-the-fly correla-
tion of network data and power consumption in data centers.
During a preliminary 6-months long experimental campaign
we created a dataset in a completely non-intrusive way with
respect to the data center’s network. The dataset allowed us
to investigate the presence of correlation between power con-
sumption and network traffic. We found that, most of the time,
power consumption and network traffic are strongly correlated
(Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient greater than
0.7). This allows to design novel approaches to improve
resiliency of data centers that do not need to install any new
software into the servers. Within the end of 2014 we count to
complete the entire architecture and to deploy it in at least one
MEF data center.
As future work, we are investigating these advantages
and we are considering fault injection techniques ([18], [19],
[20]) both on-line and off-line using fault injection techniques
[21]). Studying effects of faults on network traffic and power
consumption will help to instrument failure prediction mech-
anisms. This will indeed allow to create a classification of
correct and non-correct system behaviors that can recognize
on-the fly when the system deviates from its normal behavior.
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